Saturday, June 28, 2025

We

 


are going to be an after thought

before things really even get going.


U.S. Used Up 15-20 Percent 

of its Global THAAD Anti-Missile Arsenal 

in Just 11 Days of Mid-Intensity Combat: 

Cost Over $800 Million

militarywatchmagazine.com 06/25/25


"The U.S. Army has been estimated to have consumed 15-20 of all munitions for its globally deployed arsenal of  Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) long range anti-missile systems, after deployment to support Israeli air defences during the country’s 11 days of hostilities with Iran. A highly specialised asset designed to intercept medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles, the U.S. Army fields seven systems across five air defence regiments, and is set to operationalise an eighth by the end of the year. 


(And we act like we just have thousands of these things BTW)


"The systems are depended on to counter the arsenals of five potential adversaries including North Korea, China, Russia and Belarus, as well as Iran. Video footage has shown the launch of 39 interceptors to intercept Iranian missiles from June 13-24, although only a small portion of launches were captured on film partly due to the strict wartime censorship that was put in place in Israel. Presuming at a conservative estimate that the filmed launches from THAAD batteries accounted for 50-66 percent of total launches, total expenditure of interceptors amounted to approximately 60-80 interceptors during the 11 day conflict. 


If 80 = 20%

Then we would have 400.

How many ballistic Missiles

do you think:


"North Korea, China, 

Russia and Belarus, 

as well as Iran"

have?


I'll give you a hint,

it is well over 400.


(Side note:

Regardless of what you may think or hear:

Iran's advanced missile arsenal 

remains largely untapped

Published on 21/06/2025 

(Day of the US attack)


"From the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s forward to now, the Islamic Republic has proven far more resilient than its critics expected, in large part because 

it has a pattern of using 

short-term retreats 

to pursue long-term, 

consistent goals. 


(Like right now.)


The regime gives ground when necessary 

but always circles back 

to take back its concessions."


By comparison?

Israel has launched 30,000 strikes across five countries in 20 months

and:

Report: US seeking to boost Israeli air defenses as interceptors run low

21 June 2025, 3:36 am

(Again, reported on the day of the US attack)


"Despite IDF denials, The Wall Street Journal once again reports that the country is running low on missile interceptors for its air defense systems."

"The paper says the US is making efforts to boost Israeli defenses: by resupplying a THAAD air defense system it deployed in Israel last year, and by sending a fourth destroyer to the region decked with ballistic missile interceptor systems."


"The report says Israel could run out of interceptors

 if the conflict continues for several more weeks,"

(Understand now why the cease fire?

And a "cease-fire" is not an end to hostilities.)

"though the IDF is continuing to degrade Iran’s ability to launch missiles by destroying caches and launchers."

The last I read

the IDF thinks they got about half  of em.)



Now Back to:

U.S. Used Up 15-20 Percent 

of its Global THAAD Anti-Missile Arsenal 

in Just 11 Days of Mid-Intensity Combat: 

Cost Over $800 Million


"The expenditure of 60-80 interceptors is significant when considering a combination of three factors: their cost, the small numbers available, and the relatively low intensity of Iranian missile strikes. With each THAAD interceptor launch costing an estimated $12-15 million, air defence operations using the system deployed in Israel cost an estimated $810 million to $1.215 billion. The expenditure of this many interceptors represents 15-20 percent of the entire U.S. Army’s arsenal, which has significant implications far beyond the Middle East, and particularly in the Pacific. 


("We are going to be an afterthought

before things even really get going.")


"The intensity of Iranian-Israeli hostilities was relatively low, with Iran having fired ballistic missiles at a modest rate well below its actual capabilities in order to maintain a proportional response to Israeli attacks, avoid escalation, and retain a capacity to respond should the United States escalate by fully entering the war. A further factor in the low intensity of operations is that the THAAD system in Israel had more support from other anti-ballistic missile systems than it would in almost any other location, with Israel’s Arrow and Barak 8 systems also optimised for intercepting such high altitude missiles, while nearby AEGIS destroyers provided support with their SM-3 anti-ballistic missiles."


"Had Iran launched more intensive missile attacks, including using more missile with multiple warheads, or had it sustained bombardment beyond the 11 day conflict, the THAAD system in Israel would have seen its ability to contribute to air defence operations rapidly diminish. The system’s limitations have very significant implications for its viability both in the Middle East, and globally where it is relied on to counter arsenals that are significantly larger and more capable than that of Iran. The first foreign deployment of the THAAD system was made in June 2009 to protect Hawaii from North Korean intermediate range ballistic missiles, with a second system deployed on Guam in 2013, followed by a third in South Korea from 2016. THAAD batteries and radars have also been tested on Wake Island, which has gained growing importance in American plans for a potential war with North Korea and China, and is expected to be protected by the systems in wartime. Russia’s recent introduction of the Oreshnik intermediate range ballistic missile, its sharing of the missiles with Belarus, and its procurement of North Korean Pukkuksong-2 medium range ballistic missiles, are expected to also lead to calls to also deploy THAAD systems in Europe. Thus the rate at which the arsenal of THAAD interceptors was depleted in Israel’s defence despite highly favourable conditions bodes ill for the systems’ viability in future medium and high intensity conflicts, as well as the affordability of its operations. 

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